Divine Impassibility And The Mystery Of Human Suffering Pdf Hart


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Grand Rapids, Mich. Eerdmans Publishing Co.

Impassibility from Latin in- , "not", passibilis , "able to suffer, experience emotion" describes the theological doctrine that God does not experience pain or pleasure from the actions of another being.

Divine impassibility and the mystery of human suffering /

Within contemporary philosophy of religion there are three main ways in which God is conceptualised in relation to personhood:. The first two of these options will be familiar to many, with PP held by most contemporary monotheist philosophers of religion and NPNP mainly by those who are pantheists.

PNP , however, is a view some may not have come across, despite its proponents claiming it was the view of great philosophical theologians from the past.

However, within recent times PNP has become more popular. On the face of it, it might not be clear what the difference between PP and PNP is, and whether debate had between the two positions is substantive. The goal of this paper is therefore to clarify the debate and assess whether the many claims advocates of PNP make as to why God cannot be a person PP stand up to scrutiny or are persuasive. My suggestion will be that on the whole they do and are not.

As such, defenders of PNP will either need to defend these reasons in more detail or focus on the area I suggest the debate really rests on. The first two of these options will be familiar to many, with 1 held by most contemporary monotheist philosophers of religion and 2 mainly by those who are pantheists.

Perhaps these names are apt, but many will find them pejorative. On the face of it, it may not be clear what the debate between PP and PNP is, and whether it is a substantive one.

The goal of this paper is therefore to clarify the debate and assess whether the many claims advocates of PNP make as to why God cannot be a person stand up to scrutiny or are persuasive.

My suggestion will be that on the whole they do not. As such, defenders of PNP will either need to defend these reasons in more detail or focus on the area I suggest the debate really rests on, namely a specific understanding of divine simplicity. Although interesting, NPNP , will feature very little in the following discussion. Footnote 2.

Mawson , Assume as all perfect being theologians do that necessarily, someone is God if that person is a perfect being. Leftow , That God is a person, yet one without a body, seems the most elementary claim of theism. Swinburne , God is a person , at least in the broad sense of an entity possessing the sorts of mental states generally regarded as constitutive of personhood.

Brower , God is a person ; that is, a being with intellect and will. Plantinga , vii. Nonetheless, PP is not universally held by theists. Since most classical theists attribute intellect and will to God, they too generally regard God as personal. Whilst it might seem that PNP is a novel thesis, its defenders appeal to history, claiming this view of God is in fact the traditional one and that PP is the more modern.

Footnote 4 For instance, Davies , 59 suggests that the first occurrence of PP in English came in when John Biddle was charged with heresy for defending Unitarian beliefs about God. As such, at the very least it looks like Aquinas is asserting PP here. Despite this, for the purpose of this paper whether PP is a recent development is neither here nor there. Rather what is important is to clarify why defenders of PNP think God cannot be a person and assessing whether these reasons are any good.

In short, Cartesian souls. Like many philosophers, especially since the time of Rene Descartes , Swinburne thinks that people persons are composed of two kinds of stuff - mental, incorporeal, indivisible stuff mind and physical, extended, divisible stuff body. On this account, the real me is my mind or soul , and so I, like all persons, am essentially incorporeal. I am causally connected to what is material, but I am not myself a material thing.

I am a spirit. Taking a hylomorphic view on human constitution, Davies , 61, , Footnote 7 thinks persons are essentially bodied beings and as such purely immaterial persons are impossible. Footnote 8 What Oderberg objects to is the thought that a human person can be disembodied throughout its whole history, since he thinks humans are essentially embodied beings. However, a further point needs to be made here too, in that many proponents of PP , perhaps most, do not mean by person a Cartesian soul, and so wedding PP to this account seems unfair.

Footnote 9 Rather it appears what most proponents of PP mean by person takes its cue from contemporary ethics. Footnote What constitutes a person has undergone a lot of discussion in ethics, since the answer to this question is thought to have significant implications for debates surrounding the start and end of life.

The result of this investigation has been to adopt a criterial approach, such that when a being satisfies the criteria they are deemed a person. Footnote 11 I do not wish to enter into the debate about how these criteria are to be satisfied, but note that even within this discussion it is not the criteria themselves that are questioned, but rather just how they are to be satisfied.

Footnote 12 What then are the criteria that are usually given which are thought to confer personhood? Here are a few examples:. Warren , Tooley , McMahan , 6. What is most common among all the definitions is the thought that some fairly sophisticated level of consciousness, self-consciousness, and rationality is required in order to be a person.

Further, and more importantly, criteria such as this, and the criterial approach more generally have been used by advocates of PP when they argue that God is a person Mawson , 12—19, , 16; Craig c , , 77— Footnote 14 Given this, those advocating PNP should take the majority of PP advocates as holding to a criterial view of persons, rather than thinking of persons as Cartesian souls, Footnote 15 and as such it should be the criterial view they primarily aim their concerns at.

Now that I have clarified what is meant by a person I turn to what defenders of PNP mean when they say that God is personal. Nevertheless, given other things held by proponents of PNP I take it that we can assume that these characteristics need not imply that God has a personality, or that they are properties of God. Rather they are true predications about God, although analogically true. It seems to me that defenders of PNP would do well to further discuss what they mean when they say God is personal, since it is apt to cause confusion to some, and their position, at least to me and others I have spoken to, is not as clear as it could be.

Nevertheless, with the notions of person and personal clarified as to how their proponents think of them and as to how they will be used in the rest of the paper, we can turn to the reasons defenders of PNP give for thinking PP is mistaken. There are a number of reasons defenders of PNP give to suggest that God cannot be a person, with these mostly being due to conflicts they see arising in the divine nature when one claims PP Feser Footnote 17 As a result to avoid the conflicts, rather than denying these conflicting attributes of God, it is better, so defenders of PNP claim, to deny that He is a person.

My aim in the reminder of this paper is to show that these supposed conflicts are far from conclusive and that defenders of PNP seem unaware of much of the literature where PP is argued to be consistent with the claims that PNP supposes it is not. I therefore will suggest that the debate lies only in one area, or defenders of PNP will have to show in far greater detail, that there are the incompatibilities they claim.

As a result, a few things need to be said to defend PP. First, most theists who claim PP claim it of theism in general, rather than Christian theism. As such they might suggest that PP addresses something more fundamental to theism, rather than Trinitarian concerns.

Perhaps the thought is that whatever God is, He is at least one person. However, many of those who claim PP also give accounts of the Trinity, and as such I take it that they do not think their two claims inconsistent. Footnote 18 This could be for a number of reasons. As we shall see later, this may cause defenders of PNP to have other worries, but it does seem a viable option here. A third response would be to suggest that when we do perfect being theology PBT we are merely working out what language is applicable to God Leftow b , , and since it is greater to be a person than not this language is applicable to God.

However, so the defender of PP can claim, when person is used of the Trinity it is meant to signify something more than this. Another move would be to assume that person meant what Boethius Liber de persona et duabus naturis contra Eutychen et Nestorium , ch. To illustrate this complaint, one can look at an analogous case within Trinitarian theorizing.

In Trinitarian debates there are at least two pieces of data everyone wants to explain, that God is one substance and that God is three persons. On ST tritheism looms, whilst on LT modalism beckons. Ultimately how one comes to think of the specifics of the Trinity will largely depend upon which explanatory project they prefer. Footnote 26 Yet there is a difference in how we go about explaining these things. Does one start with the thought that God is ultimate and work to the personal, or work from the personal to get to the ultimate.

Footnote 27 The question then is as to whose starting point is best, since both try to explain the same data in different ways. Perhaps God is pure act and this rules Him out from being a person. Defenders of PNP would need to explain more fully why this is, since if it is due to implications arising from God being pure act, such as simplicity, timelessness, etc. After all, there are many in the literature who think God is simple, timeless, etc.

However, if the conception of God as pure act is important and does most of the work, defenders of PNP will need to defend how we come to think of God in this way as, for example, the ways of Aquinas which do this are highly contested by theists. Given these considerations, it seems unlikely to me that defenders of PNP will persuade many of their cause in this way, through arguing God is pure act.

Instead what I think would be more likely to persuade, is showing that being ultimate is greater than being personal, and hence the proper initial axiological judgement of PBT. Footnote 29 Or by demonstrating that the final conception of God produced by PNP is superior to that of PP and therefore its initial axiological judgement should be preferred. As such it seems to me that instead of disagreeing on initial judgements, both PP and PNP should fill out their conception of God, and on the basis of their outcome we see which starting point is to be preferred, similar to what I think often happens in Trinitarian theorizing.

Instead it seems PNP will have more weight in persuading defenders of PP that God cannot be a person by filling out their conception of God and showing its superiority and demonstrating the incompatibilities arising from God being a person. Footnote 30 Assessing these supposed incompatibilities will be for the rest of this paper to assess.

God is what accounts for there being any world at all. He is causally responsible for the existence of everything other than himself. For my part there seems no conflict in saying all these things whilst also saying God is a person as PP does. For instance, Quinn , says God is a person, yet he also defends continuous creation, the doctrine that God creates and conserves ex nihilo , He clearly sees no incompatibility here. It matters not a whit that others who hold PP disagree with Quinn, and therefore also Davies, about the nature of creation, such as Craig a , b , since the debate here is not due to a problem with God being a person but with problems that are thought internal to the doctrine of creation as Davies and Quinn understand it.

Footnote 31 Yet this too seems no obstacle to PP and once more defenders of PP , for instance Leftow , 26—34 , also defend this doctrine. Again, there seems to be no incoherence here. Some events, they often say, are not so much caused by God as permitted by him.

Firstly, suppose one holds to theological determinism, as many are apt to do, then we might wish to say that no act is permitted by God.

The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review

Within contemporary philosophy of religion there are three main ways in which God is conceptualised in relation to personhood:. The first two of these options will be familiar to many, with PP held by most contemporary monotheist philosophers of religion and NPNP mainly by those who are pantheists. PNP , however, is a view some may not have come across, despite its proponents claiming it was the view of great philosophical theologians from the past. However, within recent times PNP has become more popular. On the face of it, it might not be clear what the difference between PP and PNP is, and whether debate had between the two positions is substantive.


On Shadow of Turning: On Divine Impassibility No Access. David Bentley Hart. Pro Ecclesia. May Show details Hide details.


Wherein lies the debate? Concerning whether God is a person

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The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review

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И проклинала. Как я могла не выключить монитор. Сьюзан понимала: как только Хейл заподозрит, что она искала что-то в его компьютере, то сразу же поймет, что подлинное лицо Северной Дакоты раскрыто. И пойдет на все, лишь бы эта информация не вышла из стен Третьего узла. А что, подумала Сьюзан, если броситься мимо него и побежать к двери. Но осуществить это намерение ей не пришлось. Внезапно кто-то начал колотить кулаком по стеклянной стене.

Я думал, что он похоронен в Доминиканской Республике. - Да нет же, черт возьми. И кто только распустил этот слух. Тело Колумба покоится здесь, в Испании. Вы ведь, кажется, сказали, что учились в университете. Беккер пожал плечами: - Наверное, в тот день я прогулял лекцию.


Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering ed. by James F. Keating D. Marshall; David Bentley Hart; and Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J. The difficulty.


Impassibility

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Правда о ТРАНСТЕКСТЕ. Сьюзан понимающе кивнула. Это звучало вполне логично: Танкадо хотел заставить АНБ рассказать о ТРАНСТЕКСТЕ всему миру. По сути, это был самый настоящий шантаж. Он предоставил АНБ выбор: либо рассказать миру о ТРАНСТЕКСТЕ, либо лишиться главного банка данных. Сьюзан в ужасе смотрела на экран.

Но мысли о Сьюзан не выходили из головы. ГЛАВА 3 Вольво Сьюзан замер в тени высоченного четырехметрового забора с протянутой поверху колючей проволокой. Молодой охранник положил руку на крышу машины. - Пожалуйста, ваше удостоверение. Сьюзан протянула карточку и приготовилась ждать обычные полминуты. Офицер пропустил удостоверение через подключенный к компьютеру сканер, потом наконец взглянул на. - Спасибо, мисс Флетчер.

 Я видел алгоритм. Уверяю вас, он стоит этих денег. Тут все без обмана.

Сьюзан вздохнула: - Программа принимает ключ только в цифровой форме. Мне кажется, что тут содержится некий намек на то, что это за цифра. В тексте названы Хиросима и Нагасаки, города, разрушенные атомными бомбами. Может быть, ключ связан с количеством человеческих жертв, оценочной суммой нанесенного ущерба в долларах… - Она замолчала, снова вчитываясь в текст.

 - Уберите ногу. Взгляд Беккера упал на пухлые пальцы мужчины. Никакого кольца. Я так близок к цели, - подумал .

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The main defense of the 'traditional' view in this volume come from revisiting Thomas Aquinas, be it from Orthodox (David Bentley Hart, Paul L.

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